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In the presence of infrequent but observable structural breaks, we show that a model in which the
representative agent is on a rational learning path concerning the real consumption growth process can
generate high equity premia and low risk-free interest rates. In fact, when the model is calibrated to
U.S. consumption growth data, average risk premia and bond yields similar to those displayed by post-
depression (1938-1999) U.S. historical experience are generated for low levels of risk aversion. Even
ruling out pessimistic beliefs, recursive learning in￿ates the equity premium without requiring a strong
curvature of the utility function. Simulations reveal that other moments of equilibrium asset returns are
easily matched, chie￿y excess volatility and the presence of ARCH eﬀects. These ￿ndings are robust to
a number of details of the simulation experiments, such as the number and dating of the breaks.
JEL codes: G12, D83.
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The bull equity markets of the 1990￿s have left us with a secular (1890-1999) average 7 percent equity
return in excess of risk-free bonds.1 These ￿gures are even more striking considering that over two periods
− 1930-1942 (Great Depression and WWII) and 1974-1981 (oil shocks) − average excess equity returns
have been negative (−0.41% and −1.20%). In an economy populated by risk-averse individuals, negative
excess returns are as diﬃcult to understand as high averages. This paper shows that high and variable
equity premia and low interest rates can all be rationalized in a simple general equilibrium model in which
agents are on a recursive, rational learning path.
Since Mehra and Prescott (1985, MP), we know that a Lucas (1978) economy with power, time-additive
expected utility, complete markets, no frictions, and in which a representative agent forms rational expecta-
tions on the only source of risk (real consumption) cannot pass the test of reproducing the historical mean
equity risk premium. This impasse is labeled the equity premium puzzle. Moreover, in MP￿s framework
high risk aversion implies an implausibly low elasticity of intertemporal substitution that forces the real
riskless rate to levels in excess of historical averages, the risk-free rate puzzle (cf. Weil (1989)).
A vast literature has developed after MP had ￿rst pointed out the puzzle.2 Many papers have focused
on the role of power, time-additive, expected utility preferences which constrain the elasticity of intertem-
poral substitution to be the inverse of the coeﬃcient of relative risk-aversion (e.g. Constantinides (1990),
Campbell and Cochrane (1999), Epstein and Zin (1989)). Eﬀorts have been directed at removing the
assumption of market completeness, showing that the additional uncertainty in individual consumption
due to the absence of insurance markets for some states helps increasing the equity premium and lowers
the risk-free rate (e.g. Constantinides and Duﬃe (1995)). Another strand of literature has assessed the
importance of borrowing constraints and transaction costs (Aiyagari and Gertler (1991)).
Surprisingly, less attention has been given to the mechanism by which beliefs are formed and updated.
The early literature had in fact assumed full-information rational expectations as a way to close the model
and impose some − arbitrary − consistency on the mechanism by which beliefs are formed. This means
that agents are empowered with complete knowledge of the stochastic process driving the relevant state
variables (fundamentals) and escape any kind of parameter uncertainty and the need of (econometric)
learning. Yet, besides that its level is high, we know two additional facts concerning excess returns on US
equities. First, excess returns are subject to remarkable ￿uctuations. Second, high excess returns seem to
be a phenomenon of the XXth century, in particular of the 1950s and 90s. Interestingly, recent empirical
research has showed that both the 1930s and the early 1980s imply the presence of structural breaks in
the regime followed by fundamentals (Stock and Watson (1996)). Therefore it appears that changes in the
regime characterizing fundamentals tend to be followed by high equity premia, so there might be something
special about the historical path followed by the US economy.
A few papers have tried to oﬀer explanations of the puzzles that move from events unique to the
US history, particularly the Great Depression. Rietz (1988) shows that biasing agents￿ beliefs to re￿ect
catastrophic scenarios not present in the historical data, a sizeable equity premium can be generated
1A few recent papers have shown that the realized mean excess return is likely to be an upward biased estimate of the
ex-ante, equity premium expected by investors, e.g. Pastor and Stambaugh (2000) and Fama and French (2001). These studies
estimate an equity premium in the range 3-5%.
2Cochrane (2001), Kocherlakota (1996), and Mehra and Prescott (2003) survey the literature.
2for reasonable degrees of risk aversion. However the crash state needed to deliver the result must be
truly catastrophic (Mehra and Prescott (1988)). Also, matching the empirical volatility of excess returns
remains diﬃcult (Salyer (1998)). Danthine and Donaldson (1999) explore the same concept, showing that
Peso problems have more dramatic eﬀects in arti￿cial samples in which economy crashes are not actually
present. Cecchetti, Lam, and Mark (2000) study the eﬀects of belief distortions on asset prices. Under the
assumption that the rate of growth of fundamentals follows a two-state Markov switching process, they show
that some degree of pessimism relative to the maximum-likelihood estimates generates plausible moments.
However the origin of such pessimistic fears is unclear. This literature therefore relies on deviations between
realized and subjectively perceived beliefs, often in arbitrary ways. On the opposite, we are interested
in detecting situations in which rational pessimism and crash fears may arise as a consequence of the
application of simple but optimal maximum likelihood methods.
Abel (2002) explores the eﬀects of pessimism and doubt for equilibrium asset prices. He shows that
pessimism reduces the risk-free rate and that a peculiar kind of pessimism (uniform) also increases the
average equity premium; doubt has similar eﬀects. This makes it possible to generate plausible risk premia
for acceptable degrees of curvature of the utility function, without running into a risk-free rate puzzle. On
the other hand, Abel￿s analysis is admittedly exploratory, in the sense that the sources of pessimism and
doubt are left unspeci￿ed.3 Our paper may be read as an attempt to endogenously generate pessimism and
doubt when agents cannot form full information rational expectations, but recursively update an estimate
of the distribution of future growth rates.
When agents lack full information on some parameters characterizing the environment, their subjective
beliefs may rationally deviate from the empirical distribution of the state variables, without the need of
postulating in an ad-hoc fashion that markets agree on the possibility of some disaster state. A few papers
have studied the implications of recursive learning for asset pricing.4 However the implications for the
equity premium are not pursued. An exception is Brennan and Xia (2001): In a continuous-time general
equilibrium setting a representative agent recursively estimates the unobservable drift of dividends. Using
a risk aversion coeﬃc i e n to f1 5a n dar a t eo ft i m ep r e f e r e n c eo f- 1 0 % ,t h e yd e r i v ea ne q u i t yp r e m i u m
of 6 percent and a risk-free rate of 2.5 percent; the same parameters imply volatile stock returns and
realistic correlations between dividend growth and stock returns. Unfortunately, a risk aversion of 15
is high according to the literature standards and Brennan and Xia observe (p. 266) that the eﬀects
of recursive learning are of second-order magnitude, their assumption on the randomness of the drift
parameter accounting for most of the eﬀects. We show instead that ￿rst-order eﬀects can be obtained
from learning using a plausible degree of curvature of the utility function. Finally, Guidolin (2003) shows
that in principle at least, rational learning and pessimism may in￿ate the equilibrium equity premium and
lower the riskless interest rate, but he stops short of a full assessment of the quantitative implications of
the model through a standard calibration exercise.
The paper pursues three objectives. First, it removes the assumption of full-information (FI) rational
expectations with complete knowledge of the process of the risk factors. In particular, we focus on a
restrictive learning mechanism that does not allow any expected gains from implementing trading strategies
based on the impact on equilibrium prices of the future unfolding of parameter uncertainty. Such learning
3He writes that ￿(...) the next challenge is to explain why pessimism and doubt may occur.￿ (p. 1091). We contend that
departures from rationality are not necessary, while departures from complete information are.
4See Barsky and De Long (1993), Bullard and Duﬃe (2001), Veronesi (1999), and Timmermann (1993, 2001).
3schemes are called rational and in asset pricing applications they imply that prices re￿ect all possible,
future perceived distributions of the parameters￿ estimates (future learning).5 Second, we prove that when
a representative agent is on a learning path and the process for dividends is described by a binomial lattice
calibrated on US real consumption growth, both average excess equity returns and bond yields similar
to those displayed the by the post-depression (1934-1999) US data may be generated for low levels of
risk aversion. Third, we show that on a recursive learning path, US investors might have rationally come
to attach positive probability to crash states as a consequence of the pessimism caused by the two deep
recessions of the 1930s and 1970s. This ￿Peso problem￿ situation would have arisen in an entirely rational
and endogenous fashion. In a sense, we impose structure on the thought that
￿(...) the experience of the Great Depression continues to have a signi￿cant in￿uence on the
behaviour of those who experienced it directly or indirectly, even though it has not occurred in
sixty-￿ve years.￿ (Danthine and Donaldson (1999), p. 608)
by using the Great Depression and the two oil shocks as starting points in setting the initial beliefs held by
agents on a recursive learning path. In this sense, rational learning and irrational crash fears are shown
to be observationally equivalent, although only learning provides a foundation for the persistence and size
of the belief distortions needed to rationalize observed asset prices.
The paper has the following structure. Section 2 presents a few empirical regularities. Section 3
introduces the model. Section 4 characterizes equilibrium asset prices under full-information rational
expectations. This can be considered a version of MP￿s results, specialized to the case of an i.i.d. binomial
tree. Section 5 characterizes the rational learning scheme, and derives equilibrium expressions for asset
prices. Section 6 discusses the implications for the equity premium and the risk-free rate of the two
assumptions on beliefs. The FI case is shown to display non-trivial equilibrium properties that may prevent
the generation of high equity premia even for high levels of risk-aversion. Section 6 goes on to show how
rational learning might contribute to solve the puzzles. Section 7 conducts simulation experiments. Section
8 discusses the role of initial beliefs and performs a few additional robustness checks. Section 9 concludes.
2. Stylized Facts
We use the same annual data as Shiller (1990), appropriately extended to cover the 110 years of the period
1890-1999. Stock prices and dividends correspond to January levels of the Standard & Poors Composite
Indices. Real stock prices and dividends are obtained by dividing the series by the consumption de￿ator
series (non-durables and services). The risk-free rate corresponds to the return of a strategy that rolls
over an investment of one dollar in 4-6 months commercial paper. The real risk-free rate is calculated by
subtracting the annual in￿ation rate (calculated as the percentage change of the consumption de￿ator)
from the nominal rate. The per capita consumption growth rate series concerns non-durables and services.
2.1. Facts Concerning the Real Consumption Growth Rate
Real consumption growth data con￿rm their well-known ￿smoothness￿. The average growth rate is 1.80%
per year (identical to MP) and the standard deviation is 3.27% (lower than MP￿s 3.57%). The series
5Guidolin and Timmermann (2003b) show these learning schemes can be equivalently characterized as Bayesian learning
mechanisms when some assumptions on prior beliefs are made.
4exhibits a low degree of serial correlation (-0.15), which matches the ￿gure in MP. Hence the growth of the
endowment process is well approximated by an i.i.d. process. The volatility of real consumption growth
substantially decreases after WWII, from 4.4% over 1890-1945 to 1.4% over 1946-1999.
Such changes in the consumption process open the possibility that fundamentals be subject to structural
breaks. In particular, breaks may have been so evident to be perceived by US investors. Chu, Stinchcombe,
and White (1996) develop a procedure of real time, recursive monitoring of structural changes in regression
models. The real time nature of the algorithm allows us to locate (i.e. test for) structural breaks perceived
by the agents as they were receiving new data and making decisions. Consider the following autoregressive







φjLjgt + †t = x0
tθt + †t,
where ct is real per-capita consumption, L is the standard lag operator, and †t a white noise process. Call
ι the minimum time span over which the parameters θt ≡ [￿t φ1t ... φLt]0 are assumed to remain constant,
i.e. θτ+1 = θτ+2 = ... = θτ+ι, where τ is the time of the last structural break detected by agents and
xt ≡ [1 gt−1 ... gt−L]0. Suppose agents aim at testing the presence of a break in the regression model at
time t>τ + ι. Chu et al. suggest calculating the following ￿￿uctuation detector￿:
￿ Ft =( t − τ) ￿ D−1/2
ι (￿ θt − ￿ θι). (1)
Details on the structure of the test statistic and on the associated asymptotic bounds under the null of no
breaks are provided in Appendix A. In practice, we can think that after at least ι observations have been
received after a break in τ, the agents start the recursive calculation of ￿ Ft. If at ﬂ t the statistic hits the
bounds, then the null of no structural breaks since τ fails to be rejected. ﬂ t becomes then the time of the
new structural break. After ι further observations have been received, agents start again monitoring the
occurrence of breaks, etc. We apply these tests to:
gt = ￿ + φgt−1 + †t,
a standard AR(1) model (Timmermann (2001)). We use a value ι = 20 exceeding the average duration of
US business cycles to prevent natural ￿uctuations to be interpreted as breaks. Figure 1 shows the results
of tests based on the ￿uctuation detector (1) by plotting | ￿ F
(￿)
t | and | ￿ F
(β)
t | vs. the asymptotic bound at
1 percent test size. The null of no break is unequivocally rejected for both ￿ and β in correspondence to
the mid 1930s, the Great Depression. Indeed the mean level of ￿ ￿ jumps from 3% to 2% in the mid 1930s,
while the mean ￿ β goes from about -0.45 to -0.2; this implies a reduction in the perceived long run mean
consumption growth from 2.07% to 1.67% that ￿ts the negative real growth during 1929-1938 (-0.66%).
The middle plots of Figure 1 repeat the analysis conditioning on the occurrence of a ￿rst structural
break during the 1930s: the analysis is applied to a shorter annual data set covering the 1938-1999 period.
Although the evidence on a further break in ￿ is inconclusive, the ￿uctuation detector for β locates a second
break in the early 1980s, in the aftermath of the oil shocks. Indeed in the period 1974-1982 the average
real growth rate was 1.67%, below the 2.10% average of 1939-1973. These econometric tests suggest the
presence of two structural breaks in the fundamentals￿ process: the ￿rst in 1938, at the conclusion of the
Depression cycle, and the second in 1982, at the conclusion of the two cycles marked by the oil price shocks.
52.2. Facts Concerning Asset Returns
Over 1938-1999 the mean excess return on stocks has been 7.64%, above MP￿s 6.18%. We take this long-run
average as a measure of the ex-post equity premium. On the other hand, the average level of the risk-free
rate, 0.96%, is similar to the 0.80% calculated by MP. The volatility of the equity premium is 16% while the
risk-free rate is stable, 3.86%. Notoriously, a high volatility of excess equity returns along with a negligible
standard deviation for the risk-free rate is puzzling (Hagiwara and Herce (1997)) and has proven to be
a tough stylized fact to match (Cecchetti, Lam, and Mark (1990)). During the period following the oil
shocks, the equity premium climbs even higher (10.36%) despite the higher average risk-free rate (3.84%).
The volatility of both interest rates and the equity premium declines to.14.42% and 1.98%, respectively.
3. The Model
The model is a version of the in￿nite horizon, representative agent, endowment economy studied by MP
(1985). There are two assets: a one-period, risk-free, zero coupon bond in endogenous zero net supply,
yielding an interest rate of rt (hence Bt = 1
1+rt where B is the bond price), and a stock index with price St
in exogenous net unit supply. The stock pays an in￿nite stream of real dividends {Dt}
∞
t=1 . These dividends
are perishable, they cannot be reinvested and therefore they must be consumed in the period they are
received. The initial level of fundamentals D0 is given. The real growth rate of dividends gt ≡ Dt
Dt−1 − 1
follows a two-state Markov chain. State 1 is characterized by a high growth rate gh and can be identi￿ed
with business cycle expansions, while state 2 is a recession state in which growth is −1 <g l < 0 <g h:
During a recession fundamentals decrease. The transition matrix is
Π =
"










and ￿rst-order autocorrelation p + q − 1.
When p =1− q =1− π, the probability of switching to a given state becomes independent of the
original state, the stationary probabilities of the two states reduce to {π,1 − π}, and the ￿rst-order serial
correlation is nil. When confronted with smooth processes such as US consumption growth, a zero ￿rst-
order autocorrelation is realistic.6 In this case, the driving process for the endowment is a binomial tree.
Also, gh,g l, and π may be subject to infrequent jumps, i.e. structural breaks. For simplicity, assume that
structural breaks are observable. Events of the magnitude of the Great Depression and the world energy
crises are likely to be rapidly recognized because of their deep consequences. Thus, between today and a
certain future date T and conditioning on no structural breaks occurring, the continuously compounded
rate of growth of dividends follows a (T − t)-steps binomial process by which the dividend growth rate in
each period [t,t + 1] can be either gh with probability π or gl with probability 1 − π:
gt =
(
gh with prob. π
gl with prob. 1 − π
∀t ≥ 1, π ∈ (0,1) (2)
and the rates of growth over time are independent. The description of the physical environment is completed
by the assumption of perfect capital markets: unlimited short sales possibilities, perfect liquidity, no taxes,
6Abel (2002) and Barsky and De Long (1993) stress that to a ￿rst approximation dividends follow a random walk.
6transaction fees, bid-ask spreads, markets are open at all points in time in which news on dividends are
generated, no borrowing or lending constraints.








where Ct is real consumption. The agent maximizes the discounted value (at a rate ρ > 0) of the in￿nite
stream of expected future (instantaneous) utilities deriving from consumption of real dividends.
4. Asset Pricing Under Full Information Rational Expectations
Assume the representative agent knows the stochastic process of dividends, i.e. its binomial structure,
the parameters {gh,g l,πt}, and that she forms rational expectations. Moreover, assume that breaks occur
with such a low frequency to be safely disregarded by agents when they form expectations on future cash


















where β = 1
1+ρ, and ws
t+k, wb
t+k represent the number of shares of stocks and bonds in the agent￿s portfolio
as of period t + k. E [•|zt] ≡ Et[•] denotes the conditional expectation operator measurable with respect
to zt, the information set. Standard dynamic programming methods yield the following Euler equations:
St = E [Qt+1(St+1 + Dt+1) | zt]( 5 )
Bt = E [Qt+1 | zt], (6)







is the pricing kernel (stochastic discount factor) de￿ned as the prod-
uct of the subjective discount factor and the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution in consumption.
In equilibrium dividends are the only source of endowment and consumption, so Ct+k = Dt+k ∀k ≥ 0.
In the full information case, a solution for asset prices can easily be obtained using the method of
undetermined coeﬃcients. It is straightforward to prove that the full information rational expectations
(FI) stock price, SFI
t ,i sg i v e nb y
SFI













 • Dt. (7)
The linear homogenous form of the pricing function SFI
t = ΨFI
t Dt is a direct implication of expected utility
maximization, where ΨFI
t denotes the pricing kernel, i.e. the price-dividend ratio, see Abel (2002, p. 1079)
and Brennan and Xia (2001, p. 258), a time-varying function of πt. Assuming
ρ > πtg∗
h +( 1− πt)g∗
l , (8)
7Our empirical analysis has isolated only 2 breaks in a 110 years long time series, a frequency of 1.8%. Timmermann (2001)
uses a monthly probability of 0.3%. Guidolin (2003) calculates by simulation equilibrium prices when future, random breaks
are taken into account and concludes that closed-form solutions provide a good approximation.
7where g∗
l ≡ (1 + gl)1−γ − 1a n dg∗


















(1 + gl)−γ + πt [(1 + gh)−γ − (1 + gl)−γ]
− 1. (10)
Since the stock price is homogeneous of degree one in dividends, it follows the same binomial tree {gh,g l,π}
as dividends. Condition (8) ensures not only ΨFI





Dt+s] and existence of the equilibrium. For ρ > 0a n dg i v e n{gh,g l,π}, too low or too high levels of γ
might violate this condition, meaning that there exists no ￿nite stock price such that markets clear. When
γ is too low for (8) to hold, then γ must be close to zero. A γ ’ 0 means that the agent is nearly
risk-neutral so that πtg∗
h +( 1− πt)g∗
l ’ E[gt] and from (10) rFI ’ ρ. Then condition (8) is equivalent
to rFI >E [gt] since a risk-neutral agent will never demand risk-free bonds when it is possible to earn
a higher expected stream of cash dividends from holding the stock. No equilibrium exists as the stock
price diverges to in￿nity in response to the excess demand while the bond price falls to zero as all agents
would like to issue bonds to ￿nance their stock holdings. A high γ can prevent satisfaction of (8) since
when gl ≤ 0 there exists a state in which the agent￿s intertemporal marginal rate of substitution (IMRS)
u0(Dt+k)/u0(Dt+k−1)|gt+k=gl =( 1+gl)−γ diverges as γ →∞ . This means that all assets paying out a
positive amount of real consumption in the bad state receive an in￿nite valuation.
5. Asset Prices on a Learning Path
5.1. Rational Learning
Suppose instead that the representative agent is on a learning path: he knows that dividends follow a
binomial lattice {gh,g l,πt}.H e a l s o k n o w s gh and gl.H o w e v e r , πt is unknown and the agent estimates
it using all the available information since its last change (break), time τb. The agent recursively gains
























where I{gt+j=gh} takes value 1 when at step/time j of the binomial tree dividends grow at a high rate, and
zero otherwise. n
τb
t denotes the number of high growth states recorded between τb+1andtimet,w h i l eN
τb
t
is the total number of dividend movements recorded over [τb +1 ,t]. After a break, investors are assumed










0 re￿ects a starting belief agents hold on
the probability of a good state, with 1/N
τb
0 the associated degree of precision. As stressed by Timmermann
(2001, p. 305), the presence of infrequent breaks makes learning a much more plausible assumption than
full information rational expectations as investors rarely will have available a large historical sample from
which to derive precise estimates of the relevant parameters.
8If breaks are observable, agents know with certainty when to restart their learning process and discard information from
the previous regime. On the other hand, if agents were uncertain as to the occurrence of breaks, explicit econometric methods
to estimate the likelihood of a break at all times τ ≤ t should be used. We do not pursue this extension here.
8Agents are on a rational learning (RL) path, see Guidolin and Timmermann (2003b), i.e. they take into
account that their beliefs on π will be updated for t0 >tand incorporate the eﬀects of future learning in
their current beliefs.9 Consider the state vector Wt with stationary density parameterized by θ ∈ Θ ⊆ <p,
f(Wt;θ). Suppose an agent wants to calculate a T-steps ahead forecast W
f
t+T. If the agent does not know




















is a conditional expectation measurable with respect to the information structure zt+k,
conditional on current knowledge on θ, some estimator b θt+k. (12) shows that the agent takes into account
that her knowledge about θ will change for t0 >twith probability 1. The sequence {b θt,b θt+1,...,b θt+T−1}
enters the forecasting problem and future beliefs are recognized to be state-dependent.
For instance, consider the case in which dividends follow a binomial lattice {gh,g l,π},( T −t)=2 , and
(1 + gh)(1 + gl)=1 . The agent￿s perception of Pt
'
Dt+2 =( 1+gh)j(1 + gl)2−jDt|zt
“
depends crucially
on the contents of zt. When π is know, i.e. under full-information rational expectations, knowledge of the
history of the process is redundant as the agent has full knowledge of the lattice:
PFI'







πj(1 − π)2−j j =0 ,1,2.
a (transform of a) Bi(2,π). Suppose instead that π is unknown and the agent follows a rational learning




























































































. For instance, assume that these beliefs are correct,
i.e. b π
τb




implies recognition that to get to
9Most of the papers in the asset pricing literature use adaptive, least-squares learning schemes that do not allow prices to
re￿ect the eﬀects of future learning, i.e. belief revisions triggered by the arrival of additional information. For instance, Barsky
and De Long (1993) realize that their model ￿( . . . )d o e sn o ta l l o wp r i c e st o d a yt ob ei n ￿uenced by investors￿ knowledge that
they will be revising their estimate (...) in the future￿ (p. 299).
9(1+gh)2Dt the agent realizes that dividends have to grow at a high rate between t and t+1. This implies








t +1. So the probability of two consecutive
















































the agent ￿integrates￿ over all possible future values of b π
τb
t+k. Despite its simplicity, this framework stresses
that agents perceive their own future beliefs as random variables measurable with respect to the sequence
of future information sets. Figure 2 also reports probability calculations for the other two ￿nal nodes.
In the binomial tree model the compounded probability distribution perceived under rational learning
can be fully characterized. Guidolin and Timmermann (2003a,b) prove that the distribution for the number








































(j−i)!i! is the permutation operator for T ≥ i,a n d
−1 Q
k=0
(•) = 1. The updated
probability distribution of dividends for period t + T only depends on the number of up-states occurring
between periods t and t + T − 1 and is independent of the speci￿c path followed on the binomial lattice.
5.2. Equilibrium Asset Prices
Despite beliefs are recursively shaped by the learning process, the same features that simpli￿ed the solution
of the model under FI are in place: Consumption and dividends must coincide in general equilibrium; from
Gennotte (1986) it is known that the decision problem may be decomposed into an inference problem in
which an investor derives a predictive density for the state variable, plus a consumption-portfolio program
in which such a density is employed to ￿nd optimal policy functions. Solving the consumption problem
and applying standard methods, the following Euler equations characterize an internal optimum:













































t [•] ≡ E [•|zt,b π
τb
t ]d e ￿nes the expectation operator conditional on the information available at
time t and the current estimate of the unknown parameter π after the last break in τb <t . Since the
sequence of conditional expectations at the nodes t +1 ,t+2 , ..., t + T implied by (14) depends on the




t+2, ..., b π
τb
t+T−1, the law of iterated expectations can no longer
be used as the distributions with respect to which future expectations are taken should also discount
10future information ￿ows. Once this fact is recognized, Guidolin and Timmermann (2003b) show that if a
transversality condition holds and ρ > max{g∗
l ,g∗













































(1 + gl)−γ + b π
τb
t [(1 + gh)−γ − (1 + gl)−γ]
− 1. (16)
These results have three implications. First, the pricing kernel is no longer a constant, depending on the




t . In this sense, dividend changes between time t + k and
t + k + 1 acquire a self-enforcing nature: news of a certain sign will cause not only a stock price change
through the linear pricing relationship SRL
t = ΨRL
t Dt, but also through the revision of the pricing kernel,
ΨRL
t . Second, while under FI the risk-free rate was a constant, on a learning path it changes as a function




t .I n p a r t i c u l a r , f o r γ ≤ 1( 1+gh)−γ − (1 + gl)−γ ≤ 0 and high
dividend growth raises the risk free rate by raising b π
τb
t ; the opposite when γ > 1. Third, notice that
structural breaks are re￿ected in equilibrium asset prices only because of their ￿resetting￿ eﬀects on the




t . Although structural breaks are possible at all times, their
infrequent nature makes the cost of ignoring their future occurrence small.
Guidolin and Timmermann (2003b) show that although the process of fundamentals is ￿smooth￿ (i.e.
i.i.d. and with low volatility) rational learning may generate stock prices with many realistic features,
such as serial correlation, volatility clustering, and excess volatility. However, they fail to investigate
the implications for excess stock returns and the riskless interest rate. Furthermore, it is clear that in
the absence of structural breaks agents would eventually learn the process for dividends to an arbitrary
accuracy, so that the pricing kernel ΨRL
t would converge to ΨFI and all learning eﬀects would disappear.
In other words, by assuming the observable occurrence of breaks, we rule out the possibility of complete
information, see Timmermann (2001, p. 302).
6. Implications for the Equity Premium
6.1. Full Information Rational Expectations
In the FI case, the mapping simpli￿es to a relation between preferences [ργ ]0 and equilibrium asset returns.
















(1 + gl)−γ + πt [(1 + gh)−γ − (1 + gl)−γ]
￿
. (17)
Since dividends are i.i.d., there is no diﬀerence between the time t conditional and unconditional equity
premium. Moreover, besides the parameters {gh,g l,πt}, (17) depends on [ργ ]0 only. To stress this
dependency, we write E[r
p,FI







as [ργ ]0 vary, i.e. does a preference structure exist such that the stylized facts can be matched?
From Section 4, it makes no sense to ask what happens to asset returns when γ →∞or γ → 0
irrespective of ρ, i.e. to consider independent limits. Since we have assumed that gl < 0, for given ρ when
11γ →∞we incur in a violation of (8). Therefore we restrict ourselves to a range of relative risk aversion
that ensures ￿nite stock prices, [0,ﬂ γ), where ﬂ γ > 1i sd e ￿ned as the CRRA such that:
1+ρ = πt
£
(1 + gh)1−ﬂ γ⁄
+( 1− πt)
£
(1 + gl)1−ﬂ γ⁄
(18)
T h e r e f o r ew ew i l lt a k el i m i t sa sγ % ﬂ γ (from the left). As for the limit of expected asset returns as γ & 0








and (8) fails to hold for γ <γ.W ew r i t eγ &γ, under the understanding that γ may be zero.
The following result characterizes the basic properties of asset returns in this arti￿cial economy. To
simplify its statement, de￿ne γf and γe as the coeﬃcients of relative risk aversion such that:
−πt(1 + gh)−γf
ln(1 + gh) − (1 − πt)(1 + gl)−γf
ln(1 + gl) = 0 (20)
−πt(1 + gh)1−γe
ln(1 + gh) − (1 − πt)(1 + gl)1−γe
ln(1 + gl)=0 , (21)
if solutions to the equations exist.
Proposition 1. Under full-information rational expectations:
(a) Given ρ ≥ 0, for γ < γf, rf,FI(ρ,γ) is an increasing function of γ, while for γ > γf, rf,FI(ρ,γ)
decreases in γ so that rf,FI(ρ,γ) < 0 is possible. If γf is not de￿ned, then rf,FI(ρ,γ) is always monotone
decreasing in γ.
(b) Independently of other conditions, E[r
p,FI
t (ρ,γ)] ≥ 0, E[r
p,FI
t (ρ,0)] = 0. γf ≤ γe so that, given
ρ ≥ 0, there exists a γmax (γf ≤ γmax ≤ ﬂ γ) such that for γ below γmax E[r
p,FI
t (ρ,γ)] is an increasing
function of γ, while for γ > γmax, E[r
p,FI
t (ρ,γ)] decreases in γ.
Proof: See Appendix.
The proposition oﬀers direct implications for the possibility to produce under full information a risk-
free rate and an equity premium consistent with the evidence. The naive notion that a high coeﬃcient of
relative risk aversion γ can oﬀer a way to resolve the puzzles does not apply to our model. From (b), we
can only hope that ﬂ γ is high enough to span an interval that includes a γmax such that a risk premium as
high as in the data obtains. Section 7 examines whether in a standard calibration exercise a model with
FI does stand any chance to match observed features of asset returns series.
6.2. Rational Learning






t ;ρ,γ)Dt. Therefore ￿ assuming the absence of a structural break between t and
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12Ad i ﬀerent concept is the equity premium expected at time t, conditional on the information on the






























t [(1 + gt+1)−γ]
. (23)
Notice that (23) represents a subjective notion of the equity premium as a subjective expectation operator
￿ E
τb






















i.e. the objective unconditional equity premium (left-hand side) on a rational learning path diﬀers from the
objectively expected subjective equity premium (right-hand side). This diﬀerence raises an important issue.
Traditionally, the literature has discussed the circumstances under which a model generates a stationary
distribution for excess returns matching sample moments. In particular, the equity premium E[r
p
t+1(ρ,γ)]
is identi￿ed with a long-run sample mean of excess equity returns. While E[r
p,RL
t+1 (ρ,γ)] can be quanti￿ed
by simulating prices in (22) and (16) and taking averages over simulation trials, this quantity is in general










that can be similarly obtained by simulation. Although
the average (expected) subjective equity premium may be possibly interesting in itself (see Abel (2002) and
Section 8.4), it is clear that the only quantity that can be directly compared to the data is E[r
p,RL
t+1 (ρ,γ)].
While the current section reports results for the objective conditional expectation of the equity premium
under RL, Section 7 uses simulations from a calibrated version of our model to produce results on the
objective unconditional equity premium to be compared with the evidence from Section 2. A Lemma in
Guidolin and Timmermann (2003b) shows that ΨRL
t is an nondecreasing and convex function of b π
τb
t when
γ ≤ 1, and a decreasing and convex function of b π
τb
t when γ > 1. Based on this result, it is possible to prove:
Proposition 2. γ < 1 and pessimistic beliefs (b π
τb
t < πt)i m p l y
r
f,RL
t (ρ,γ) <r f,FI(ρ,γ)
Et[r
p,RL




We are able to isolate a combination of risk-aversion and beliefs ￿ low risk aversion and pessimism ￿
for which the conditional risk premium is higher under RL than the (unconditional) risk premium under
FI. In principle, the incorporation of learning eﬀects points in the direction of higher equity premia for
plausible preferences, provided the economy is characterized ￿on average￿ by some degree of pessimism.






t ) ≤ rf,RL(ρ,γ) should make the occurrence of a
risk-free rate puzzle unlikely.
Contrary to the FI case, under RL it is extremely diﬃcult to characterize the behavior of equilibrium
expected returns and of the equity premium as a function of preference parameters only. In fact, no
analog to Proposition 1 can be proven because ρ and γ have eﬀects on asset returns that depend on
the state of beliefs. For instance, if there is pessimism and relative risk aversion is progressively lowered
towards zero, the conditional premium can increase, a somewhat counter-intuitive result. The intuition is
that as an economy becomes risk-neutral, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (1/γ)d i v e r g e sa n d
r
f,RL
t (ρ,γ) % ρ as the demand for bonds increases for consumption smoothing. As for stock returns, the
13RL pricing kernel increases in b π
τb
t faster and faster as γ & 0. However, as we approach risk-neutrality,
the growing ΨRL
t reduces the contribution of dividend growth to stock returns. The ￿rst eﬀect re￿ects the
fact that under near-risk-neutrality the agents will revise the kernel ΨRL
t (b π
τb
t ) more heavily as ￿ πt % π,
i.e. starting from pessimistic beliefs learning gives a stronger contribution to high realized excess returns
through the elimination of the undervaluation. The second eﬀect re￿ects the pure decline of dividend yields
as we approach risk-neutrality. Although which of the two eﬀects dominates is a function of gh,g l, ρ, and
b π
τb
t ,i fγ is close to zero the former eﬀect will prevail and the conditional premium increases as γ & 0.
Since also the risk-free rate decreases, the equity premium increases.
7. Simulations
7.1. Model Calibration
We set a yearly ρ =0 .02, which implies an annual discount factor β ’ 0.98, a common value in the literature.
In the tradition of MP, we experiment with alternative levels of relative risk aversion. Suppose that real
consumption growth changes at quarterly frequency. So its annual rate of growth follows a transformation
of Bi(4,π) process. We condition our exercise on the fact that US investors observed the two structural
breaks in real consumption uncovered in Section 2.1. Therefore we perform a double calibration exercise:
the ￿rst with reference to the period 1938-1981, the second with reference to the period 1982-1999.
With reference to the period 1938-1981, we calibrate the quarterly growth process by taking gh =+ 1 .5%,
gl = −1.25%, and π =0 .645. These parameters guarantee an annual mean growth of 2%, an annual
volatility of 2.6%, while the annual growth rate is positive 87% of the time. On a learning path initial
beliefs n0 and N0 concur to determine the equity premium. During the depression period 1930-1937,
the average real consumption growth had been -0.5% and growth had been negative half of the time.
Undoubtedly, beliefs had to be pessimistic. In particular, the ￿ π1938
0 that makes the assumed quarterly






















1 − b π1938
0
¢3 ∼ = 0.50. (24)
b π1938
0 =0 .35 approximately satis￿es (24) and implies a slightly negative expected real growth of consump-
tion (-0.3%), a pessimistic albeit not extreme belief. b π1938
0 must be assigned some weight, a measure of
its strength against subsequent information. Although the experience of the Great Depression is likely to
have left a big mark on collective beliefs, we limit its precision to 32, the number of quarters in the cycle
1930-1937 (NBER dating). Therefore ￿ n1938
0 =1 1a n d ￿ N1938
0 =3 2s ot h a t￿ n1938
0 / ￿ N1938
0 ’ 0.35. In our view,
calibrating a pessimistic belief for the post-Depression era is merely a way to give content to the claim that
￿(...) the experience of the Great Depression (...) [had] a signi￿cant in￿uence on the behaviour of those
who experienced it directly or indirectly (...)￿ (Danthine and Donaldson (1999, p. 608)).
The second calibration exercise concerns the period following the structural break determined by the
oil shocks of the 1970s. We calibrate the quarterly process of consumption growth by taking gh =+ 1 .5%,
gl = −1.25%, and π =0 .63. These parameters imply an annual mean of 1.9% and annual volatility of
2%. During the cycle 1974-1981, average real consumption growth has been lower than in the 1960s and
recollection of the pessimistic evaluations of the growth slowdown of those years makes a parameterization
of the initial beliefs re￿ecting some degree of pessimism plausible. It is easy to verify that b π1982
0 =0 .5
14produces an annual mean growth rate of 0.4%, a volatility of 2.8%, and positive rates of annual growth
69% of the time. These features closely match the process of real fundamentals during the late 1970s. We
also set ￿ N1982
0 = 8 (the number of quarters in the cycle 1980-1981) and therefore ￿ n1982
0 =4 .
7.2. The Equity Premium under Full Information
In the full-information case, it is straightforward to calculate γ=0a n dﬂ γ ’ 58.8: outside this interval
the FI equilibrium fails to exist. Figure 3 depicts the equity premium and the risk-free rate under FI
when γ changes and no breaks are imposed. Notice that under FI no simulations are required since the
expectations involved by (17) can be directly evaluated. The equity premium puzzle admits no solution: an
average risk-free rate below 1% per year can be attained only using a constant relative risk aversion above
57. Incidentally, the available window is also very narrow as ﬂ γ ’ 58.8a n df o rγ > 58 the real risk-free
rate becomes negative, which is counterfactual. However, even for risk aversion coeﬃcients as high as 58,
the ex-ante expected risk premium is at most 3.8%. Assuming that the consumption growth process is
adequately described by a binomial lattice, it is impossible to ￿nd a level of risk aversion such that ex-post
realized excess returns in the order of 7% are generated.
7.3. The Equity Premium under Rational Learning
For alternative levels of γ,w es i m u l a t eZ =1 0 ,000 independent, quarterly time paths for real dividends
and equilibrium asset prices when the agent is on a rational learning path and breaks occur in 1938 and
1982. After each break, initial beliefs are calibrated to plausible values as of January 1938 (￿ n1938
0 = 11,
￿ N1938
0 = 32) and January 1982 (￿ n1982
0 =4 , ￿ N1982
0 = 8). Fundamentals are drawn according to the
parameters discussed in Section 7.1. The time paths have a length equal to the post-depression period
1938-1999, 248 quarters. Since the statistical properties we match refer to annual series, after simulating
248-quarter long series for dividends and prices, we aggregate them to obtain 62-year long annual series.
One issue that arises when assessing asset pricing properties on a learning path by simulation is the
existence of the equilibrium along the entire simulated path. Indeed the market belief b π
τb
t changes as new
realizations of the growth process come along. From Section 5 we know that given ρ > 0a n db π
τb
t , γ 6=1
could be chosen either too large or too small in order for the equilibrium to exist at time t.I np a r t i c u l a r ,
when beliefs are strongly pessimistic (b π
τb
t << π), γ >> 1 might be excessive to support the equilibrium. It
is also possible that strongly optimistic beliefs (b π
τb
t >> π) might disrupt the RL equilibrium when γ << 1.
The occurrence of any violation at any point of a simulated path t =1 ,...,T invalidates the ability of the
path itself to represent an equilibrium outcome from an arti￿cial RL economy. We handle the issue in a
pragmatic way. First, we limit the simulations to an interval for the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion such
that divergence of (15) is unlikely, γ ∈ [0.3,2]. This is also the interval including values of the coeﬃcient
of relative risk aversion that are commonly thought of as plausible. Second, we check convergence of (15)
monitoring the progressive shrinking of the contribution to SRL
t of successive terms in (15).
Figure 4 plots the unconditional premium and the risk-free rate when agents are on a rational learning



















































where j =1 ,2,...,Zindexes simulation paths, and n
τb
t,j evolves randomly on each path. Other unconditional
moments are de￿ned similarly. 90% con￿dence bands are also plotted. As for the FI values, they are
obtained by simulation as well since the occurrence of breaks slightly changes results relative to Figure 3.
As shown by Proposition 2, γ < 1 combined with pessimism pushes the RL premium higher than under FI.
In particular, the RL equity premium is decreasing in γ < 1, so a moderate curvature of the utility function
is consistent with generating high excess returns. For instance, for γ =0 .3 the equity premium over the
62 years covered by the exercise is 5%, a remarkable result in the premium literature. A 90% con￿dence
interval generated from the distribution of the simulated equity premia under RL is wide ([3,7.1]), including
premia close to the 7.6% target reported in Section 2 (and represented by a solid bar in the plots). 51%
of the simulations generated equity premia in excess of 5%, and many (about 24%) were above 7%. For
γs above 1.3 the equity premium becomes negative, an indication that downward revisions of ΨRL
t as b π
τb
t
moves (on average) towards π reduce realized excess returns. The annual rate of return on short-term
bonds is always above 2 percent, above the 1 percent observed over the period 1938-1999. In fact, under
both RL and FI, it takes a downward drifting endowment process in order to produce equilibrium values
of the risk-free rate below 2%. However, Figure 4 also shows that ￿ relying on a low γ ￿ a learning-based
explanation does not incur in the risk-free rate puzzle.
A point often insisted upon (Cecchetti et al. (2001)) is that proposed resolutions to the equity premium
puzzle have been moderately successful at reproducing ￿rst moments but that diﬃculties remain when it
comes to match higher-order moments, in particular variances. Under FI and regardless of the presence
of breaks, equity returns inherit the stochastic properties of the endowment process. Since the growth in
fundamentals is assumed to be i.i.d. and is calibrated to match the smoothness of the US economy, it
implies not only a non-volatile, i.i.d. process for excess returns, but also a constant interest rate. Hence
the FI model stands no chance to reproduce the excess volatility of stock returns vs. consumption growth.
On the opposite, under the RL model the volatility of real stock returns and excess equity returns can be
easily matched (at roughly 18%). Moreover, realistic variability in the equilibrium interest rate appears.
7.4. Matching Other Properties of Asset Returns
A point often insisted upon (Cecchetti et al. (2001)) is that proposed resolutions to the equity premium
puzzle have been moderately successful at reproducing levels of the risk-free rate and of the risk-premium,
although diﬃculties remain when it comes to match higher-order moments, for instance variances. Since
Table I has also reported other descriptive statistics concerning real stock returns, excess returns, and short-
term yields, we engage in the same type of evaluation for asset returns simulated from the model. Given
preferences [ργ ]0, for each simulation trial we calculate descriptive statistics χj(ρ,γ|￿ n0, ￿ N0)( j =1 ,. . . ,
Z) and report averages ﬂ χ(ρ,γ|￿ n0, ￿ N0) ≡ Z−1 PZ
j=1 χj(ρ,γ|￿ n0, ￿ N0). Figures 5-7 plot the following (average)
statistics as a function of relative risk aversion: excess returns standard deviation, the percentage of
simulations for which the null hypothesis of zero serial correlation is rejected at a nominal size of 5% (using
the Ljung-Box statistic of order 8), the percentage simulations for which the null of no serial correlation
in squared asset returns is rejected at 5% (using the LB(8) statistic, interpreted as a test of volatility
16clustering), and the correlation between interest rates and excess returns.
Under FI and regardless of the presence of breaks, the model is clearly incapable of capturing some
stylized facts: Equity returns simply pick up the stochastic properties of the assumed process of endowment
growth. Since the growth in fundamentals is assumed to be i.i.d. and is calibrated to match the smoothness
characterizing the US economy, it implies not only a non-volatile, i.i.d. process for excess returns, but also
a constant interest rate. Hence the FI model stands no chance to pick up interesting stylized facts, such
as excess volatility of stock returns vs. consumption growth, and the rich statistical properties of the real
risk-free rate.10 A sf a ra sR Li sc o n c e r n e d ,F i g u r e5s h o w st h a tf o ras m a l lγ < 1 the volatility of real
stock returns and excess equity returns can be easily matched. However this conclusion does not fully
apply to the risk-free rate: although RL produces time variation, it is insuﬃcient. On the other hand, it
is remarkable that learning can generate suﬃcient variation in real stock prices at the same time matching
the volatility of fundamentals and not producing excessive variation in riskless interest rates, a result that
has proven elusive in previous research (see Cecchetti et al. (1990)).
Figure 6 focuses on serial correlation and volatility clustering. Table I shows that while annual real
and excess returns on equities display no sign of serial correlation or ARCH, the opposite holds for the
risk-free rate that has long memory. Under RL, simulated real and excess stock returns display some mild
structure in the ￿rst two moments when γ is small, as evidenced by a percentage of simulations between 30
and 50 that show a signi￿cant Ljung-Box statistic at 5%. As γ increases above one, these ￿gures rapidly
increase above 90%, sign of strong and counterfactual correlation and volatility clustering. In the case of
the risk-free rate, independently of γ almost 100 percent of the simulations display signi￿cant correlation
both in returns and in squared returns. Finally, Figure 7 plots the average simulated correlation coeﬃcient
between excess returns and the real-risk free rate. In this case, the stylized fact to be matched is a small,
negative correlation (-0.05). It is clear that FI has an advantage, since (apart from breaks) the FI risk-free
rate is constant and uncorrelated with any other random variable. On the other hand, the graph shows
that for small values of γ the average simulated correlation is low (-0.15), as required. We take Figure 7
as evidence favorable to a learning based explanation of US asset returns in the XXth century.
7.5. A Path Calibration
As a more stringent test of the model￿s predictive ability, we perform a path-calibration: since realized
consumption growth rates are observed for every year of the period 1938-1999, we ￿t the binomial lattice
to the data and let our representative agent learn π by using the sign of realized changes in consumption
to infer whether gt equals either gh > 0o rgl < 0. This calibration strategy is similar to Brennan and
Xia (2001). Figure 8 shows the dynamics of b π
τb
t implied by US consumption data at annual frequency.
The eﬀects of the Great Depression are evident, as b π
τb
t starts declining in 1929. The big jump at the
end of the 1930s is also caused by the assumption that agents perceived a break in 1938 and re-started
their estimation from pessimistic beliefs (￿ n1938
0 =2 ￿ N1938
0 =8 , annualizing quarterly values). Despite a
slowdown at the end of the 1940s, the three decades following 1938 are marked by rapid upward revisions
of b π
τb
t . By the early 1970s, ￿ π ’ 0.75 implying a perceived high mean growth rate and moderate volatility.
The oil shocks end this booming period and induce an early 1980s break, characterized by mild pessimism
(￿ n1982
0 =1 ￿ N1982
0 = 2 consistently with previous choices).
10The FI statistics simply consist of straight lines that do not depend on the relative risk aversion coeﬃcient.
17The right panel shows equilibrium stock prices obtained assuming ρ =0 .02 and γ =0 .3. For most of
the sample period, FI prices stay above the RL ones. When at the end of the 1990s the perception of π
eventually catches up with values consistent with the statistical properties of US consumption data, RL
and FI prices converge. The (unreported) simulated riskless rate shows that as pessimism is imposed, the
RL rate remains below the FI rate, barely exceeding a plausible level of 3% on average. We extend the
exercise and calculate equity premia and excess return volatility for all levels of γ in [0.3, 2].11 Results are
qualitatively similar to those in Section 7.3 and are quantitatively interesting for low risk aversion. When
γ =0 .3w e￿nd an equity premium of 3.3% and an average riskless interest rate of 3.2% for the period
1938-1999. The corresponding values under FI are 0.7% and 3.6%. As obtained before, the equity premium
is monotone decreasing in γ (over the [0.3, 2] interval). Although an equity premium of 3.3% does not
entirely solve MP￿s puzzle, the ability of the model to explain roughly half of MP￿s puzzle is encouraging.
7.6. Dynamic Properties
A further set of restrictions implied by RL can be tested: on one hand, since learning is stronger in
the aftermath of structural breaks, the data should display deviations from the unconditional (full-sample)
statistical properties − such as higher than average equity premia and volatility − over the periods following
breaks; on the other hand, since we have calibrated initial beliefs to re￿ect some pessimism in the aftermath
of breaks, our simulations ought to generate these stronger deviations from FI.
We study these implications in two ways. First, Figure 9 shows that there is evidence in the data
of higher equity premia and volatility in the aftermath of breaks (the solid vertical lines in the plots).
The top graph plots 10- and 15-year forward rolling window equity premia calculated by collecting partial
samples at each date between 1930 and 1990 and averaging excess equity returns over these intervals.12
The bottom graph does the same with reference to sample standard deviations. The solid horizontal lines
provide unconditional benchmarks, 7.1% and 19.5% for the equity premium and volatility. Clearly, all
potential breaking dates are followed by above average conditional equity premia, both on 10- and on
15-year sub-samples. For instance, using 15-year windows 1938 is followed by a 11% premium, 1982 by a
10.1% premium. Results for volatility are instead mixed: while the 1930s break is certainly followed by
above-normal volatility, this does not happen for other breaks, notably for the one in the early 1980s. In
this sense, our model seems to propose a plausible explanation for the high equity premium phenomenon
but shows some diﬃculty at generating the correct dynamic volatility patterns.
Second, we use the path calibration of Section 7.5 to measure a few properties of excess returns over
periods that follow the two structural breaks; we use also in this case two identical 15-year long sub-samples,
i.e. 1938-1952 and 1982-1996. For ease of exposition we report a single arithmetic average over the two
periods. We ￿nd indeed evidence of stronger deviations from FI in the aftermath of breaks: for γ =0 .3
the equity premium is 7.1% and the standard deviation of excess returns is 22.7%.
11We set the parameters as: gh =+ 3 .1% and gl = −0.7%; although the choice of π is irrelevant for RL prices, it matters
for FI results and we pick π =0 .795. For the period 1982-1999 we set identical gh and gl, and π =0 .78.
12For instance, we consider the 1930-1939 (10-year window) and 1930-1944 (15-year window) samples, calculate mean excess
equity returms, and report the results in correspondence to 1930.
188. Discussion
8.1. The Role of Initial Beliefs
We perform robustness checks on initial beliefs: Would the results be stronger if beliefs in the aftermath
of the Great Depression had been even more pessimistic than assumed? To provide some answers to





t (ρ,γ)] with ￿ N0 = 32 as in Section 7.3 but with ￿ n0 that changes between ￿ n0 =9( ￿ π0 =0 .28) and
￿ n0 =2 2( ￿ π0 =0 .69) in steps of two (i.e. ￿ n0=11, 13, etc.) whenever possible.13 Figure 10 shows that when
γ < 1, pessimistic initial beliefs are not required. Even when ￿ π0 = π, γ =0 .2 gives an equity premium of 2
percent, with a 90% con￿dence band wide enough to include premia of 3.5 percent. Moreover, should we
￿nd a reason to specify beliefs more pessimistic than ￿ π1938
0 =0 .35, we would provide complete solution to
the equity premium puzzle. When γ =0 .2a n d￿ π0 =0 .28, the equity premium is 6 percent and the 90%
con￿dence band spans the interval [3.2,8]. Finally, for γ = 2 even optimism does not help. For instance
￿ π0 =0 .59 produces a negative premium. Our intuition is that optimism raises the risk-free rate faster than
expected stock returns, thus reducing the premium.
8.2. Integrating out Initial Beliefs
We study whether rational learning can contribute to our understanding of the equity premium and risk-
free rate puzzles when no restrictions on initial beliefs are imposed and time τb beliefs are integrated out.
Suppose we take an agnostic view on beliefs at the beginning of 1938, admitting pessimism and optimism in
equal degrees. Assume that given ￿ N1938
0 =3 2 , the initial belief ￿ π1938
0 could have been with equal probability
any value in the interval [0.445, 0.845], symmetric around the unknown π =0 .645, i.e. ￿ π1938
0 is assumed
to have a uniform prior density.14 We evaluate asset returns on a rational learning path by simulating
time series for the real endowment and equilibrium prices 50,000 times, when in correspondence to each
simulation the initial belief is drawn afresh from a uniform prior in independent fashion. Thus while Section























where ￿ π0 = b n0/ ￿ N0.15 Again, we set ρ =0 .02 and vary γ over the interval [0.3, 2].
Figure 11 gives an encouraging picture. Even imposing no assumptions on initial beliefs, a model
incorporating learning eﬀects gives an appreciable contribution to explain the two asset pricing puzzles,
provided γ is less than one. For a low γ, the equity premium exceeds 3% and the 90% con￿dence band is
[1.7, 5.1]. The risk-free rate is 3.4%. Interestingly, these unconditional expectations are obtained without
imposing absurd degrees of curvature on the utility function. This result is made possible by the combina-
tion of two factors: Firstly, the equilibrium risk-free rate is low when γ is low independently of the state of
beliefs; Secondly, when γ < 1 the price-dividend ratio is increasing and convex in ￿ πt, implying that upward
13The in￿nite sum de￿ning the RL pricing kernel may not converge. In fact with very low γs (such as 0.2) the equilibrium
is unlikely to exist for high ￿ n0s, i.e. optimistic beliefs.
14The length of this interval is arbitrary. However all other beliefs seem to be extreme and implausible. For instance,
￿ π0 =0 .845 implies a yearly mean growth rate of 4.4%, which is rather exceptional for a developed country.
15We apply a similar randomization to initial beliefs as of 1982. Given ￿ N
1982
0 =8 , the initial belief ￿ π0 is drawn with equal
probability on the interval [0.43, 0.83], symmetric around the unknown π =0 .63.
19revisions of beliefs typical of pessimistic economies will have a stronger (positive) eﬀects on equity returns
than the downward revisions that dominate in optimistic economies.
8.3. Number and Dating of the Breaks
Up to this point we have identi￿ed 1938 and 1982 as the dates in which breaks in the endowment process
occurred. Both breaks occur during protracted and deep recession phases (according to oﬃcial NBER
dating): the ￿rst break between 1937 and 1938 (cycle 1933-1937), the second between 1980 and 1981 (cycle
1981-1982). However, the two dates used in our calibration were selected as the year(s) containing the
end quarter of the recession periods during which the break was perceived. One might wonder about what
happens to the number and nature of the breaks in the case in which the ￿rst break is associated with (say)
1932 instead of 1938. Conditional on a 1932 break, we perform a statistical analysis similar to Section 2.1
(still taking the minimum no-break period to be ι = 20 years) and uncover some evidence of a break in the
drift parameter ￿ in the early 1950s, particularly in 1954. Interestingly, the 1954 break is another ￿negative￿
break in the sense that it can be once more characterized by a downward revision of growth expectations
on the US economy: while during the New Deal and during WWII fundamentals grew at high rates (e.g.
the implied unconditional growth rate is 5.4% over the interval 1933-1946), after the end of WWII the US
economy experienced a structural slowdown that agents might have perceived as a break. For instance,
using data for the period 1933-1954, the implied unconditional growth rate would have been 2.9% only,
indication of a remarkable slowdown in 1947-1954. When we condition on a break in 1954, there is once
more evidence of a third break in correspondence of the oil shocks, although some uncertainty now exists
on the dating: while the drift parameter implies a break as early as 1974, the AR(1) coeﬃcient gives weak
indication for 1975 and strongly signals a break as late as 1982, after the second shock. In any event, the
entire period 1974-1982 matches a famous episode of slowdown of the US economy (see Maddison (1987)).
What matters for our purposes are the asset pricing eﬀects of a third break. Notice that the early
1950s represent a period in which the US economy cools oﬀ after the rapid growth caused by the war
eﬀort. Therefore, if perceived by the agents, the 1954 break is likely to have been accompanied by relatively
pessimistic beliefs: 1948, 1949, and 1954 were all recession years with nonpositive real consumption growth;
while in 1933-1946 the average annual consumption growth had been 3%, in the interval 1947-1954 it
declines to only 0.4%. Similarly to Section 7.1, we set ￿ π1954
0 =0 .5a n d ￿ N1954
0 = 32 (hence ￿ n1954
0 =1 6 ) ,
corresponding to the sequence of short recession periods characterizing the interval 1947-1954. We then
repeat the simulation experiments.16 For γ =0 .3 the equity premium over the 68 years covered by the
exercise is 4.7% while the riskless interest rate is 3.2%. The annualized volatility of excess equity returns
is 18.8%. Roughly 60% of the simulations exceed 5%. Hence our results on the possibility of generating
equity premia in the order of 5% and interest rates below 3% with low risk aversion do not depend on
either the exact number and location of the breaks or on the details of the calibration of initial beliefs.
8.4. Doubt, Pessimism and Rational Crash Fears
Abel (2002) shows that pessimism and doubt on the distribution of future consumption growth rates may
provide a solution to the puzzles. It is therefore interesting to link our ￿ndings to Abel￿s and show that
rational learning endogenously generates pessimism and doubt. Figure 12 shows the evolution over the
16We set gh =+ 1 .5%,g l = −1.25%, π =0 .635 (1932-1954), π =0 .665 (1955-1981), and π =0 .63 (1982-1999).
20interval 1938-1999 of the subjectively perceived distribution of the 5- and 50-years ahead real consumption







j=0,i=2 0 , 200. These
distributions are obtained as averages of distributions calculated according to (13) along the 10,000 sample
paths of Section 7.3. The same calibration is used. Right plots show a few selected subjective distributions
compared to the FI (approximately) normal benchmark. The support of the distributions has been re-scaled
to display annualized growth rates.
Abel (2002) de￿nes pessimism as the case in which the RL predictive distribution is ￿rst-order stochas-
tically dominated by the FI one. Pessimism reduces the equilibrium risk-free rate. Figure 12 shows that
under rational learning pessimism clearly dominates. Although not reported, the implied cumulative dis-
tribution functions display the desired pattern of stochastic dominance. Of course, the eﬀect is stronger in
the 1940s and again in the 1980s, but it seems that a rational agent might have underestimated the overall
location of the distribution of future growth rates for long periods. The eﬀects on the risk-free rate are
qualitatively similar, as shown by Proposition 4, provided γ < 1. Abel (2002) strengthens his de￿nition
to uniform pessimism, when the subjective distribution lies entirely to the left of the objective one, with
no contact points. Uniform pessimism is suﬃcient to in￿ate the equity premium. Figure 12 stresses that
uniform pessimism obtains at many dates in our calibration. The eﬀect on the equity premium is similar
and obtains through the convexity of the RL pricing kernel for γ < 1: since upward revision of beliefs
increase prices more than downward revisions, in a pessimistic economy the former are more likely than
the latter and this impresses a substantial upward drift to equilibrium stock prices.
Abel de￿nes doubt as the case in which the RL predictive distribution is a mean-preserving spread
of the FI one. He shows that since the pricing kernel is convex, doubt will decrease the risk-free rate








j=0 describes a leptokurtic distribution with much thicker tails than the FI bench-
mark. Once more, in our framework doubt is re￿ected in a higher equity premium because for γ < 1t h e
pricing kernel ΨRL
t is a convex function of b πt. Therefore when rational learning is supplemented with his-
torical evidence on the US economy, pessimism and doubt do emerge in endogenous fashion, increasing the
risk premium on equities for moderate degrees of curvature of the utility function.
9. Conclusion
This paper shows that there exists an alternative way in which extreme events such as the Great Depression
or the oil shocks can generate high equity premia. While previous literature has focused on the induced,
permanent biases in the stationary beliefs of investors in an ad hoc fashion, we show that if agents are
on a recursive learning path, tail events may produce long-lasting eﬀects on equilibrium prices. For our
calibration of beliefs in the aftermath of the depression and the oil crises, we obtain that equity premia in
the order of 4 to 5 percent are compatible with complete markets, the absence of friction, and power utility
with a reasonable degree of curvature. These ￿gures come close to the original size of the equity premium
pointed out by Mehra and Prescott and explain more than 60 percent of the average excess returns on
stocks for the post-depression period 1938-1999. The resulting con￿dence bands for the equity premium
expected as of 1938 are wide, including premia in the order of 8 percent. The equilibrium risk-free rate is
in the order of a realistic 2 percent. The model also matches the observed variance of the risk premium and
of real stock returns over the period 1938-1999, thus showing that the high volatility of real stock returns
21in excess of real consumption growth is no puzzle.
Section 8.2 has made our case stronger by showing that the results are only slightly weakened when no
restrictions are imposed on initial beliefs and the arti￿cial economy is simulated starting from beliefs drawn
from an ignorance prior. In this case we generate equity premia in the order of 3 percent, with con￿dence
bands wide enough to include 7 percent premia. These ￿ndings require the use of low risk aversion levels,
so that we avoid falling in the criticized set of explanations that rely on high risk aversion.
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βjLjgt + †t = x0
tθt + †t,
where ct is real per-capita consumption, L is the standard lag operator, and †t a white noise process. Call
ι the minimum time span over which the parameters θt ≡ [￿t β1t ... βLt]0 are assumed to remain constant,
i.e. θτ+1 = θτ+2 = ... = θτ+ι, where τ is the time of the last structural break detected by agents and θt is
a L + 1 column vector while xt ≡ [1 gt−1 ... gt−L]0. Suppose agents aim at testing the presence of a break
in the regression model at time t>τ +ι using a sequential procedure with power one.17 Chu et al. suggest
calculating the following ￿￿uctuation detector￿:
￿ Ft =( t − τ) ￿ D−1/2
ι
‡
￿ θt − ￿ θι
·
,
where ￿ Dι = ￿ M−1
ι ￿ V ￿ M−1
ι , ￿ Mι is a consistent estimator of (ι − τ − 1)−1 Pι
j=τ+1 xjx0
j and ￿ V is a consistent
estimator of the moment matrix lim
ι→∞(ι − τ − 1)−1E[SιS0
ι], with Sι =
Pι
j=τ+1 x0
j†j. Under the null of no
break and a few regularity conditions, ∀t ≥ ι, Chu et al. (1996) provide asymptotic bounds for the statistic
| ￿ F
(k)














a2 +l nι − ln(t − ι)
¢‚1/2)
=1− [1 − 2[1− Φ(a)+aφ(a)]]
L+1 , (26)
where Φ(•)a n dφ(•) are the cdf and the pdf of a standard normal random variable, respectively. a is a
constant characterizing the monitoring boundary that is to be selected conveniently to guarantee a desired
type I error of incorrect detection of a break when there is none. For instance, when there is only one
regressor, α =5 % , then a ’ 2.79.In practice, we can think that after at least ι observations have been
received in the aftermath of a break at τ, the agents start the recursive calculation of ￿ Ft (replacing unknown
moments with their sample counterparts). Given a certain α, if at ﬂ t | ￿ Fﬂ t| hits the monitoring boundary in
(26), then the null of no structural breaks since τ fails to be rejected. ﬂ t becomes then the time of the new
structural break.
17A constant level α sequential test of power one is a stopping rule such that P(τ < ∞|H0) ≤ α and P(τ < ∞|H1)=1 ,
where H0 corresponds to the null of no structural break.
18Chu et al. (1996) show that for small ιst h e￿nite sample size of the test is substantially lower than the nominal one.
Hence a large enough ι is required.
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t depends on γ only through the denominator. It increases in γ as long as the denominator
decreases, and viceversa. We study the ￿rst derivative of the denominator as a function of γ ≥ 0, d(γ):
d0(γ)=−π(1 + gh)−γ ln(1 + gh) − (1 − π)(1 + gl)−γ ln(1 + gl)
Since gl < 0 <g h, −(1 − π)(1 + gl)−γ ln(1 + gl) is positive and increases in γ, while the ￿rst term of the
expression for d0(γ) is negative and decreasing in γ. In particular, ‘im
γ→+∞
− π(1 + gh)−γ ln(1 + gh)=0 −
while ‘im
γ→+∞
(1−π)(1+gl)−γ ln(1+gl)=+ ∞ and the second term dominates by diverging. Two cases are
then possible: Either d0(0) > 0 (no crossing) so that γf c a n n o tb ed e ￿ned and r
f,FI
t decreases ∀γ ≥ 0, or
d0(0) < 0 and the two functions de￿ning d0(γ)c r o s sa tγ = γf such that d0(γf)=0 ,r f,FI increases over
[0,γf) and decreases for higher γs.
(b) We show that γf ≤ γp. De￿ne
kf(γf)=−π(1 + gh)−γf
ln(1 + gh) − (1 − π)(1 + gl)−γf
ln(1 + gl)=0
ke(γe)=−π(1 + gh)1−γp
ln(1 + gh) − (1 − π)(1 + gl)1−γp
ln(1 + gl)=0
The cases γf =0≤ γe =0a n dγe =+ ∞≤γe =+ ∞ are trivial and obviously do not contradict the
statement of the proposition. Suppose instead that both quantities are negative at γ =0 , so that at least
initially they increase in γ. Assume there exists γf such that kf(γf)=0 . We show that ke(γf) < 0,
implying that γ must be increased even more in order to reach ke(γe)=0 .
ke(γf)=−π(1 + gh)(1 + gh)−γf
ln(1 + gh) − (1 − π)(1 + gl)(1 + gl)−γp
ln(1 + gl)
= −π(1 + gh)−γf





< −π(1 + gh)−γf




(1+gh) < 1a n dl n ( 1+gl) < 0. Thus ke(γf) < 0. Since ke(γ)i si n c r e a s i n gi nγ it then
takes a γe > γf in order for ke(γe)=0 . An implication is that kf(0) < 0i ss u ﬃcient for ke(0) < 0.
If ﬂ γ can be found, since gl < 0 <g h and kf(0) < 0, we know that γe > γf. Therefore there must exists a
γmax > γf such that E[r
p,FI
t (ρ,γ)] is maximized by γ = γmax. In the interval (γf,γe) the expected equity
premium keeps growing and it is easy to see that the CRRA maximizing E[r
p,FI
t (ρ,γ)] must lie on the right
of γf. T h es a m eh o l d sw h e nkf(0) > 0( s ot h a tγf =0 ) .H o w e v e r ,w h e nkf(0),k e(0) > 0t h e nγmax =ﬂ γ as
we know that E[r
p,FI
t (ρ,γ)] ≥ 0, ruling out γmax = 0 as a maximizer: if rf,FI(ρ,γ)g r o w si nγ faster than
E[r
e,FI
t (ρ,γ)] the equity premium would end up being negative for a large enough γ. 2
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 . All the expectations are taken with respect to true probability measure πt.
















25Since for γ ≤ 1 ΨRL
t is nondecreasing in ￿ π
τb
t and pessimism is de￿ned as ￿ π
τb

































where the last line derives from an application of the covariance inequality (as ΨRL
t+1 can be seen as a
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≥ 1. Using this fact and ΨFI


















































t (1 + gh)−γ +( 1− ￿ π
τb
t )(1 + gl)−γ ≤
1+ρ
πt(1 + gh)−γ +( 1− πt)(1 + gl)−γ = r
f,FI
t (ρ,γ),
t h eF Ie q u i l i b r i u mr i s k - f r e er a t e ,s i n c e( 1 + gh)−γ < (1+gl)−γ and ￿ π
τb
t ≤ πt. Finally, since the equity premium















t (ρ,γ) ≤ r
f,FI

















t )e m p l o y sap r e c i s i o nNt+1 = Nt+1justmakestheeﬀect stronger, as a pessimistic belief ￿ π
τb
t < πt
reduces more the RL pricing kernel for Nt +1t h a nf o rNt. The real simpli￿cation here is that we ignore integer problems.
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Figure 1 
Structural Breaks in the Process of Real Consumption Growth 
The plots report the outcomes of real-time tests of structural breaks in the process of real consumption growth. The 
structural break test applied is the ￿fluctuation detector￿ by Chu, Stinchcombe, and White (1996). The estimates on 
which the fluctuation detector is based are produced by an AR(1) model: 
t t g ε β µ + + = 1 - t g    
with E[ε t]=0 and constant variance. The minimum time span ι  used to initialize the estimates over which the 
estimates are not subject to breaks is 20 years. The left plots refer to the drift µ. The upper plots refers to the entire 
sample period 1890-1999, the middle ones to the more recent period 1938-1999, the bottom plot to the recursive 
estimates of the coefficient over the two sample periods. The right plots refer instead to the AR(1) coefficient β . 
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Figure 3 
Equity Premium and Real Risk-Free Rate Under Full-Information (No Breaks) 
The plots report the equity premium and the real risk-free rate under full information rational expectations as a 
function of the coefficient of relative risk aversion γ . The top graph plots the equity premium and the real risk-free 
rate together, while the two smaller graphs at the bottom plots these two quantities separately and vs. a benchmark 
represented by the sample means over 1938-1999 (annual frequency), the horizontal lines. The model is calibrated by 
assuming gh = 1.5%, gl = -1.25%, π  = 0.645, and ρ  = 0.50% on a quarterly basis. This ρ  implies that the annualized 
discount factor is approximately equal to β  = 0.98.  
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Figure 4 
Asset Returns Under Rational Learning vs. Full Information (Two Breaks) 
The plots report the equity premium and the real risk-free rate under rational learning and full information rational 
expectations as a function of the coefficient of relative risk aversion γ . The model is simulated (on a quarterly basis) 
by assuming gh = 1.5%, gl = -1.25%, π  = 0.645 for 1938-1981 and π  = 0.63 for 1982-1999. ρ  = 0.50% to imply an 
annualized discount factor approximately equal to β  = 0.98. Under rational learning we also calibrate initial beliefs as 
of January 1938 (n = 11, N = 32,  34 . 0 ￿ = π ) and as of January 1982 (n = 4, N = 8,  5 . 0 ￿ = π ). FI values are 
calculated under the assumption of breaks occurring and being observable. Solid bars represent empirical values. 
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Figure 5 
Volatility of Excess Equity Returns and Real Risk-Free Rate Under Rational Learning vs. 
Full Information (Under Two Breaks) 
The plots report the standard deviation of excess equity returns and the real risk-free rate under rational learning and 
full information rational expectations as a function of the coefficient of relative risk aversion γ . The model is 
simulated (on a quarterly basis) by assuming gh = 1.5%, gl = -1.25%, π  = 0.645 for 1938-1981, and gh = 1.5%, gl = -
1.3%, π  = 0.63 for 1982-1999. ρ  = 0.50% on a quarterly basis. This ρ  implies that the annualized discount factor is 
approximately equal to β  = 0.98. Under rational learning we also calibrate initial beliefs as of January 1938 (n = 11, 
N = 32,  34 . 0 ￿ = π ) and as of January 1982 (n = 4, N = 8,  5 . 0 ￿ = π ). FI values are calculated by simulations under 
the assumption of breaks occurring and being observed.  
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Figure 6 
Percentage of Simulations (Ex-Ante Probability) of Rejecting the Null that Excess Equity 
Returns and Real Risk-Free Rate Are I.I.D. (Under Two Breaks) 
The plots report the percentage of simulations under RL and FI for which the null hypothesis of zero serial 
correlations in the levels and squares of asset returns is rejected. The hypothesis is tested by assessing whether the 
portmanteau Lijung-Box statistics are significant at 5%. In the case of squared asset returns, rejection of zero serial 
correlation is taken as indication of volatility clustering (ARCH). These percentages are plotted as a function of the 
coefficient of relative risk aversion γ . The model is simulated (on a quarterly basis) by assuming gh = 1.5%, gl = -
1.25%, π  = 0.645 for 1938-1981, and π  = 0.63 for 1982-1999. ρ  = 0.50% on a quarterly basis. Under rational 
learning we also calibrate initial beliefs as of January 1938 (n = 11, N = 32,  34 . 0 ￿ = π ) and as of January 1982 (n = 
4, N = 8,  5 . 0 ￿ = π ). FI values are calculated by simulations under the assumption of breaks occurring. 
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Correlation Between Excess Equity Returns and Real Risk-Free Rate (Under Two Breaks) 
The graph reports the average simultaneous correlation between excess equity returns and the short-term, real 
interest rate under RL and FI as a function of the coefficient of relative risk aversion γ . The model is simulated (on 
a quarterly basis) by assuming gh = 1.5%, gl = -1.25%, π  = 0.645 for 1938-1981, π  = 0.63 for 1982-1999. ρ  = 0.50% 
on a quarterly basis. Under rational learning we also calibrate initial beliefs as of January 1938 (n = 11, N = 32, 
34 . 0 ￿ = π ) and as of January 1982 (n = 4, N = 8,  5 . 0 ￿ = π ).  
Correlation of Real Risk-Free Interest Rates and 












0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8
γ
Full information RE Rational learning
   31
Figure 8 
Equilibrium Asset Prices on a Path Calibration 
The plots report the dynamics of the beliefs about π  and of the equilibrium stock price when a representative agent 
is on a rational learning path and perceives two breaks, in 1938 and 1981. Under full information the model is 
calibrated by assuming gh = 3.1%, gl = -0.7%, π  = 0.795 for 1938-1981, and gh = 2.8%, gl = -0.3%, π  = 0.78 for 
1982-1999. The subjective rate of time preference ρ  is set to 2%, while the coefficient of relative risk aversion γ  to 
0.3. I Under rational learning we calibrate initial beliefs as of January 1938 (n = 2, N = 8,  25 . 0 ￿ = π ) and as of 
January 1982 (n = 1, N = 2,  5 . 0 ￿ = π ). On a learning path, the random dividend process is calibrated on the actual 
historical path of the US real consumption growth rate, setting I{gj=gh} = 1 when realized consumption growth is 
positive. 
































1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Year




Rolling Window 10- and 15-Year Period Equity Premium and Volatility 
The plots report the mean and standard deviation of excess returns over sub-samples of 10 and 15 years after each 
date (included in the sub-sample) in the interval 1930-1999. The solid, bold line represents the equity premium 
(mean excess returns) and the volatility of excess returns over the entire sample period 1938-1999, 7.6% and 16%, 
respectively.  
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Figure 10 
Effect of Initial Beliefs on the Equity Premium and the Real Risk-Free Rate  
Under Rational Learning 
The plots report the equity premium and the real risk-free rate under rational learning as a function of the January 






0 / ￿ N n = π . The model is simulated (on a quarterly basis) by assuming gh = 1.5%, gl = -
1.25%, π  = 0.645 for 1938-1981 and π  = 0.63 for 1982-1999. ρ  = 0.50% on a quarterly basis. This ρ  implies that the 
annualized discount factor is approximately equal to β  = 0.98. Initial beliefs as of January 1982 are held fixed to the 
calibration n = 4, N = 8. 
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Asset Returns Under Rational Learning when Initial Beliefs are Uniformly Distributed 
Plot of average asset returns when initial beliefs on π  (as of 1938 and 1982) are uniformly distributed around the 
calibrated values of = 0.645 for 1938-1981 and π  = 0.63 for 1982-1999. The model is simulated (on a quarterly basis) 
by assuming gh = 1.5% and gl = -1.25%. ρ  = 0.50% on a quarterly basis.  
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Dynamics of 5-year horizon (average) beliefs on 
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Dynamics of Average Beliefs on Future Consumption Growth 
The plots report average beliefs on H-horizon (annual) real consumption growth. The first row of plots shows 
beliefs over a 5-year horizon, the second row over a 50-year horizon. The model is simulated (on a quarterly basis) 
by assuming gh = 1.5%, gl = -1.25%, π  = 0.645 for 1938-1981, and π  = 0.63 for 1982-1999. ρ  = 0.50% on a 
quarterly basis. 
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